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Preliminary Evaluation of the Disease Surveillance System During Influenza
Outbreaks of Pandemic Scale
Abstract
In the United States it is currently unknown whether the influenza surveillance system is capable of
producing timely and accurate data for case estimation during an outbreak of pandemic scale. This
simulation provides a preliminary evaluation of the surveillance system’s ability to collect data and
produce timely and accurate trends of cases confirmed with an influenza virus. For the evaluation, a
computer-based simulation of the data-collection process was used, which was validated with real
demographic and epidemiologic information. The results were analyzed to determine the most significant
behavioral and operational factors influencing the data collection and to propose the exploration of more
efficient data-collection policies for the generation of timely and accurate trends of confirmed cases.
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INTRODUCTION
andemic influenza (PI) outbreaks are unpredictable and potentially devastating public
health issues. This unpredictable behavior necessitates proper outbreak management as the
disease progresses. In the U.S., one of the most important information sources comes from
data collected by the state viral surveillance labs (VSL). This information is in turn reported
to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which aggregates other reports of confirmed
cases to present a final daily number per state and to estimate pandemic trends.

P

During a pandemic influenza outbreak, the capacity of the VSL is generally exceeded due to the
high demand of testing services, which are offered for free. This tendency forces the VSL to
restrict the arrival of specimens from healthcare providers, based on operational factors of the
surveillance system. The effect of these operational factors, along with other behavioral factors
of the population could result in a distorted view of the outbreak’s epidemiologic features, a
delay in accurate information, and unnecessary costs.
A screening experiment was performed to explore the effect of different factors in the disease
predictive error of a trend of confirmed cases, using an agent-based simulation of disease spread.
AGENT-BASED SIMULATION
The sampling and testing of specimens were simulated in an urban population. This model is
developed on top of an existing agent-based model that simulates the spread of a pandemic
influenza H1N1 virus, and one of its seasonal antigenic variants (SI). Both viruses are seeded in
a population that considers schools, workplaces, and errand places. The simulation was
populated using information from the Hillsborough County in Tampa, Florida. The data collected
for the simulation were obtained from the 2002 U.S. Economic Census, the 2001 American
Community Survey, and the 2001 National Household Travel Survey. For a population of
1,000,000, a total of 12,800 businesses and 500,000 households were simulated.
The underlying influenza spread model described in Prieto and Das 20141 was used. Under this
model, and in the absence of containment measures, an infected individual contacts a susceptible
according to the following probabilities:
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Where
pts,h ,PI and pta,h ,PI are the probabilities that a susceptible individual is infected at her household at

time t by either a symptomatic( s ), or an asymptomatic ( a ) PI individual.
RPIs is the number of infected PI cases that are created by an already infected case. Note that a

similar set of equations exist for SI ( pts,h ,SI , pta,h ,SI ). Values of RPIs =1.8, and RSIs =1.3 were used as
the reproduction numbers for the PI and the seasonal influenza viruses, respectively.
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w s t  and w a t  are the infectiousness profiles of an individual depending on her symptomatic

status. The w t  of the H1N1 was used for both viruses and was extracted from empirical
studies on the viral shedding of symptomatic volunteers2 (Figure 1 is an example of w s t  ).
ct ,h , ct ,w , and ct ,o are the number of contacts made by the infectious case during a day in her
s

household ( h ), workplace ( w ), or other errand places ( o ). These contacts are generated by the
simulation model.2 The factors  h ,  w , and  o account for closeness and duration of contacts.
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Figure 1. Example of a viral shedding profile for influenza
Simulating the collection of specimens. The simulated collection process is represented in
Figure 2. Once individuals get sick from influenza, they seek health care with probability p sh .
Factor levels psh are 0.5 and 0.25, and were based on estimates from Internet surveys conducted
during the 2009 pandemic.3 The additional parameters in Figure 2 are justified as follows:
For probability of severity ( ps ), the following levels were tested: 0.05, 0.15, 0.25. These levels
are slightly higher compared to the hospitalization estimates in Shrestha et al.4 to account for
severe cases that were not hospitalized and to better represent scenarios of higher testing
demand. The probability of being in a facility ( ptf ) was investigated through sensitivity analysis
(level were 0.1, 0.5, 0.9).
The probability that a patient has the ability to pay for an onsite lab test is pwp . The levels 0.5,
0.7, 0.9, were used, based on the chances that a U.S. patient has private insurance or Medicaid.5
Rapid influenza diagnostic tests were not included as part of the simulation as they were not
accurate enough to influence physicians’ decisions to submit samples to the VSL.
Simulating the testing of specimens. The aim here was to replicate the operation of one of the
real VSL. The extreme theoretical maximum of the VSL in Tampa is around 1000 specimens per
day, under pandemic conditions (personal communication, Dr. Lillian Stark, retired virologist from
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the Florida Bureau of Laboratories). Using this upper bound, L=300 and L=600 were chosen as

more plausible lab capacity levels to be explored in the simulation. The samples sent to the lab
are processed on a first-in–first-out policy. If the number of samples received is greater than the
lab capacity, the backlog of samples is processed the next day. If a sample waits for 3 days
without being processed, it is discarded as unusable. The assumption was that all samples tested
are correctly classified as the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test used has a very high
sensitivity and specificity. This testing results in a daily count of confirmed pandemic cases.
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Figure 2. Process of the collection and submission of influenza specimens to the state viral
surveillance labs
EVALUATION OF THE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
The performance of the system was measured through the disease predictive error (DPE), which
can be defined as follows:
Let u kj be the estimator of the reproduction number fitted for the series of pandemic cases, in
each factor level combination k , and simulation replicate j .
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Let ckj be the estimator of the reproduction number fitted for the series of lab confirmed
pandemic cases.
Values for u kj and ckj can be obtained respectively with the Lotka-Euler equations6:
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Where r j is the exponential growth rate of the pandemic case series for each j in the combination

k . A final value of u k was obtained by averaging the reproduction numbers u kj of all the
simulation replicates in the combination. A final value for ck was obtained similarly. The disease
predictive error (DPE) is then calculated as DPEk  uk  ck . Note that lower DPEs indicate
more accurate estimations of the real pandemic trend. Several scenarios were replicated and the
DPE was observed in each replicate. Analysis of variance and multiple comparison tests were
performed after running the experiment.
RESULTS
A total of 108 scenarios resulted from all the possible factor-level combinations (i.e., 2 levels for
p sh , 3 levels for ps , 3 for ptf , 3 for pwp and 2 for L). Each scenario was replicated 20 times. To
analyze the effect of factors in the differences between the estimations, a full factorial design of
experiments was performed. The test shows that all five factors were significant at 5%
significance (i.e.,   0.05 ). Most of the two-way factor interactions were also significant, with
the exception of the interaction between psh and pwp .
From the multiple comparisons tests, we observed that increasing VSL capacity increases the
DPE accuracy. This seems reasonable as an increased capacity allows the daily testing of
otherwise expiring samples, and refines the estimate of the number of confirmed cases per day.
In addition, it was observed that the factor combinations yielding lower numbers of VSL
submissions tend to produce more accurate values for the DPEk . For example, as the seeking
healthcare behavior ( psh ) decreases, fewer individuals are eligible for testing ( ptf ), which
reduces the number of samples discarded by VSL.
DISCUSSION
A screening experiment was performed to explore the effect of different factors in the disease
predictive error of a trend of confirmed cases, using an agent-based simulation of disease spread
in an urban population. Although the experiment is a very simple abstraction of the reality, it
unravels some of the patterns that seem to be true in a real situation of specimen sampling and
testing.
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To our knowledge, existing VSL receive and test specimens at their order of arrival (i.e., first-in
first-out). With this practice, VSL can increase the DPE accuracy if the VSL lab capacity is
increased. As it is expensive to increase lab capacity, VSL managers might consider other testing
strategies, such as testing as many specimens as the existing capacity permits, and selecting those
specimens at random out of the pool of arriving specimens. Another strategy is to forecast the
testing capacity by using existing trends such us Google Flu and Flu Near You. Such strategies
are still under evaluation and our plan is to provide results on their performance in the near
future.
From these findings, what is perhaps more surprising is that the levels of factors that contribute
to the reduction of the specimen testing load are contributing to the DPE accuracy. Lower factor
levels result in fewer samples submitted to the VSL, which reduces the number of samples
discarded. These results might suggest that screening policies for restricting the number of
specimens to test seem to also increase the DPE accuracy. Several states implemented these
strategies during the 2009 pandemic. For example, in Michigan, specimen testing was restricted
by recommending only the submission of high-risk clinical cases (e.g., hospitalized pregnant
women and the elderly) to the state labs. Policies like this one might be tested for their impact in
the DPE using modeling approaches like the one proposed in this study. If the policies prove to
be effective in increasing DPE accuracy, such screening practices might be recommended for
routine surveillance.

SUMMARY BOX
What is already known about this topic? There has been considerable research on estimating
confirmed pandemic influenza cases from real outbreak information. However, it is currently
unknown whether the influenza surveillance system is capable of producing timely and accurate
data for case estimation as the pandemic outbreak progresses. Such information can reduce the
uncertainty in the operational decisions to control the outbreak.
What is added by this report? This report provides a preliminary evaluation of the surveillance
system’s ability to produce timely and accurate case-confirmed data from a pandemic influenza
outbreak. This preliminary evaluation showed that each factor tested in the model has a
significant effect in the timeliness and accuracy of case-confirmed data. In addition, by the initial
observation of the factors, we were able to propose the exploration of policies for more efficient
and affordable data collection.
What are the implications for public health practice, policy, and research? These results
validate current practices for specimen screening and increased testing capacity. However, it is
important to consider more cost-effective strategies that could reduce the number of arbitrarily
discarded samples and also improve trend estimation. These strategies include: (1) using
forecasts to determine how many samples to test using existing online surveillance systems, (2)
randomly choosing as many specimens as the capacity permits, and (3) implementing routine
specimen screening. Further research is needed to evaluate the previously proposed screening
strategies. These methods can be extrapolated to evaluate the surveillance infrastructure under
other respiratory viruses with sustained human-to-human transmission such us the respiratory
syncytial virus (RSV) and the enterovirus D68.

Published by UKnowledge, 2015

43

Frontiers in Public Health Services and Systems Research, Vol. 4, No. 3 [2015], Art. 1

REFERENCES
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

Prieto D, Das TK. An operational epidemiological model for calibrating agent-based simulations
of co-circulating pandemic and seasonal influenza outbreaks. Health Care Manag Sci 2014; April
8 [Epub ahead of print].
Carrat F, Vergu E, Ferguson N, Lemaitre M, Cauchemez S, Leach S. Timelines of infection and
disease in human influenza: a review of volunteer challenge studies. Am J Epidemiol
2008;167:775–85.
Brooks-Pollock E, Tilston N, Edmunds J, Eames K. Using an online survey of healthcare-seeking
behavior to estimate the magnitude and severity of the H1N1v influenza epidemic in England.
BMC Infect Dis. 2011 Mar 16;11:68. doi: 10.1186/1471-2334-11-68.
Shrestha S, Swerdlow D, Borse R, et al. Estimating the Burden of 2009 Pandemic Influenza A
(H1N1) in the United States (April 2009-April 2010). Clin Infect Dis. 2011 Jan 1;52 Suppl 1:S7582. doi: 10.1093/cid/ciq012.
Persons with and without Insurance Coverage by State: 2009. (2012)
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0156.pdf; accessed November 2014.
Wallinga J, Lipsitch M. How generation intervals shape the relationship between growth rates
and reproductive numbers. Proc R Soc B 2007; 274: 599–604. DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2006.3754;

http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/274/1609/599

https://uknowledge.uky.edu/frontiersinphssr/vol4/iss3/1
DOI: 10.13023/FPHSSR.0403.01

44

